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Monday, July 18, 2011

Sagana v Francisco

ARNEL SAGANA, Petitioner,

vs.RICHARD A. FRANCISCO, Respondent

GR No. 161952 October 2, 2009

On Dec.13, 1994, Arnel Sagana filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Quezon City. He alleged that on November 20, 1992, Richard Francisco, with intent to kill, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh.

On January 31, 1995, process server Manuel Panlasigui attempted to personally serve the summons to respondent, Francisco, at his address: No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City but was unsuccessful because the occupant, who refused to give his identity, said that the respondent is unknown at the said address. Subsequently, the trial court attempted to serve summons to respondent’s office through registered mail on February 9, 1995. However, despite three notices, the respondent failed to pick up the summons.

The Trial Court then dismissed the case on account of “petitioner’s lack of interest to prosecute”, noting that the petitioner did not take any action since the filing of the Server’s Return on 8 February 1995. In response, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that he exerted efforts to locate the respondent and that respondent indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City. The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on August 4, 1995, conditioned upon the service of summons on the respondent within 10 days from receipt of the Order.

Thus, on August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar tried to serve summons at the respondent’s address but was told by Michael Francisco, the respondent’s 19-year old brother, that the respondent no longer lived at the said address. As such, Iconar left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco.

On November 10, 1995, the petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, since the respondent still failed to file an Answer despite the service of summons. The trial court granted the Motion, finding that the summons was validly served through his brother, Michael, and allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court documents were furnished to respondent at his address.

On March 1, 1996, petitioner and movant Michael Francisco, through his counsel, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, filed a Manifestation and Motion denying that he received the summons or that he was authorized to receive the summons on behalf of his brother. He alleged that the substituted service did not comply with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, since summons was not served at the defendant’s residence or left with any person who was authorized to receive it on behalf of the defendant. Michael Francisco also asserted in an Affidavit of Merit that his brother had left their residence in March 1993, and that respondent would only call by phone, or write his family without informing them of his address.

Thereafter, Michael Francisco submitted his respective Opposition, Reply, and Rejoinder. In his Rejoinder, he attached a copy of an Affidavit prepared by the respondent, dated December 23, 1992, where he declared himself a resident of No. 36 Sampaguita St. The affidavit was notarized by Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, the same lawyer who represented respondent’s brother before the trial court.

The trial court denied Michael Francisco’s Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, holding that: “plaintiff had already sent numerous pleadings to defendant at his last known address. As also pointed out by [petitioner] in his Opposition, movant has not adduced evidence, except his affidavit of merit, to impugn the service of summons thru him. Movant herein also admits that defendant communicates with him through telephone. Movant, therefore, being a person of sufficient age and discretion, would be able, more likely than not, to inform defendant of the fact that summons was sent to him by the court.

On 20 September 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff.

On November 23, 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that he received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on November 9, 1999, and that the same was contrary to the law, facts, and evidence, and prayed that his appeal be given due course.

On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file their respective briefs, a copy of which was sent to respondent by registered mail at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City.

The respondent attended the preliminary conference on September 3, 2002, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, on August 13, 2003, the appellate court rendered the Decision granting the appeal and setting aside the Decision of the trial court on the grounds that the service of summons was irregular and such irregularity nullified the proceedings before the trial court. The trial court’s decision was void since it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he alleged that respondent did, in fact, reside at No. 36 Sampaguita St. To prove this assertion, petitioner submitted the original copy of the envelope containing respondent’s Notice of Appeal, which indicated respondent’s return address to be No. 36 Sampaguita St. Nonetheless, on January 29, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether there was valid service of summons upon the respondent.

HELD: YES. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find there was proper substituted service of summons upon the respondent.

Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court provided:

Section 8. Substituted service. – If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

The personal service of summons was twice attempted by the trial court, although unsuccessfully. The trial court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent through his place of work, but to no avail. These diligent efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the first sheriff's return, the process server's notation, as well as the records of the case. Moreover, respondent’s claim that he moved out of their residence on March 1993 without informing his family of his whereabouts despite the regular calls and letters is incredulous. It is even more implausible when the respondent admitted to receiving the trial court’s decision on September 20, 19999 which was sent to No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City, and that his Notice of Appeal indicated the same address. He also admitted to receiving a copy of the appellate court’s order for a preliminary conference which was also sent to the same address. Finally, it is unbelievable that, since respondent and his brother was assisted by the same lawyer, none of them was able to inform respondent of the receipt of summons.

Indeed, there was no proof presented as to when respondent left and then returned to his original home, if he actually did leave his home.

The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.

Under the circumstances of this case, the respondent was duly apprised of the action against him and had every opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner. However, since he refused to disclose his true address because of his own pretenses, it was impossible to personally serve summons upon him.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The 13 August 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its 29 January 2004 Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.